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Abstract 
Delay-tolerant networking (DTN) is a term invented to describe and encompass all types of long-delay, disconnected, disrupted or 
intermittently-connected networks, where mobility and outages or scheduled contacts may be experienced. ‘DTN’ is also used to refer 
to the Bundle Protocol, which has been proposed as the one unifying solution for disparate DTN networking scenarios, after originally 
being designed solely for use in deep space for the ‘Interplanetary Internet.’ We evaluated the Bundle Protocol by testing it in space 
and on the ground. We have found architectural weaknesses in the Bundle Protocol that may prevent engineering deployment of this 
protocol in realistic delay-tolerant networking scenarios, and have proposed approaches to address these weaknesses. 
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1. Introduction 
Delay-tolerant networking was originally proposed as a 
generalisation of NASA-led work to move to packetized 
networking for its spacecraft. That work was named the 
‘Interplanetary Internet.’ There, long propagation delays 
between spacecraft and scheduled, planned, contacts dominate 
communications. Extending the scope of the problem space to 
also include addressing very different, disrupted, terrestrial ad-
hoc networks, including military networks, significantly 
increased interest in and funding for this new approach to 
networking, and has led to further development of the Bundle 
Protocol suite. The Bundle Protocol attempts to encompass 
many environments and use cases beyond its original deep 
space scenario, even though those other cases can be very 
different in connectivity and networking requirements [fig. 1]. 
We completed the first in-space tests of the Bundle Protocol 
for the Interplanetary Internet on the UK-DMC satellite  [1], 
and have combined our practical experience with theoretical 
analysis to provide a detailed consideration of many technical 
aspects of the Bundle Protocol. The design of the Bundle 
Protocol ignores the reliability concerns that led to the 
development of the well-known ‘end-to-end principle,’  [2] 
and also raises other technical issues. The issues that we have 
uncovered include the important reliability and timing 
problems that we highlight here  [3]. 
2. Technical Approach 
The Bundle Protocol is intended to embody a new 
architectural approach to networking. It is not by itself directly 
compatible with other networking protocols such as the 
Internet Protocol suite, and cannot be as it attempts to 
introduce new approaches to identification, addressing and 
routing. However, the Bundle Protocol can be layered over 
these other networks using ‘convergence layer adapters’ [fig. 
2]. Given the prevalence of IP networking, most Bundle 
Protocol development has been with convergence layer 
adapters for the existing TCP/IP suite, although there has been 
some work over other protocol suites, including CCSDS for 
space agencies and AX.25 for ham radio use. 
The Bundle Protocol specifies a new way of transmitting data 
in a complex protocol format that is assembled from different 
blocks for different purposes. Blocks and header information 
can be inserted, removed and modified by intermediate nodes.  
Emphasis on security has been a focus of the design of the 
Bundle Protocol from an early stage, with a complex security 
architecture that provides authentication of messages and 
encryption of data delivered. This is a deliberate change from 
earlier architectures; security was famously deliberately left 
out of the Internet’s TCP/IP suite, and had to be retrofitted 
later with IPsec, HAIPE, SSL and other protocols. However, 
this focus on security has neglected protocol reliability. 
Transmissions and memory storage do not always produce 
perfect copies (although we may wish to believe so) and do 
have non-zero error rates. Any introduced errors must be 
detected with deliberate checks. A well-designed network 
protocol will sanity-check its headers to make sure that the 
information it is exchanging was received reliably before 
being processed. It may also sanity-check its payload data. 
Checking payload data must also be done in any case by the 
highest networking layer handling the payload, in accordance 
with the end-to-end principle, to detect introduced errors. 
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Figure 1 – Comparing different DTN scenarios 
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Figure 2 – Convergence layers under the Bundle Protocol 
In practice, responsibility for end-to-end reliability usually 
falls to the protocol providing end-to-end transport, which is 
trusted by local applications – here, that is the Bundle 
Protocol. When payload data is encrypted or authenticated, a 
reliability check comes as a side-effect of the security check.  
However, the ability to permit block information to be 
deliberately altered en route in the Bundle Protocol, without 
security checks on that in-the-clear information, because any 
detectd alteration is viewed as an attack, weakens overall 
reliability. Errors can be introduced and can go undetected. 
The Bundle Protocol also includes node-to-node 
authentication. This can provide a lower-level reliability 
check, again as a side-effect of a security mechanism.  
Alternatively, the Bundle Protocol can rely on the reliability 
checks in convergence layers and lower protocols. In either 
case, relying on layers underneath the Bundle Protocol to 
guarantee correctness of data sent by the Bundle Protocol is 
hoping for the best in violation of the end-to-end principle, 
and leads to a more complex protocol stack. 
The approach adopted by the Bundle Protocol requires high-
complexity, processor-intensive, security mechanisms to be 
implemented just to provide an approximation of functionality 
of a lightweight checksum, as a side-effect of the 
authentication and encryption that the security mechanisms 
provide. The threat model for the environment may not 
require the level of security offered by the security 
architecture, but will require end-to-end reliability checks in 
accordance with the end-to-end principle. As a result, the 
security mechanisms are now required to be implemented to 
gain an assurance of end-to-end reliability. This is an added 
cost to deploying the Bundle Protocol. 
3. Results 
Known deployments of the Bundle Protocol have run without 
any security being implemented. Three in-space tests of the 
protocol for the Interplanetary Internet – in our UK-DMC 
satellite tests and later on the Deep Impact/EPOXI comet 
probe  [1] and on the International Space Station – chose not to 
implement bundle security. Not doing so can be attributed to a 
number of different reasons, including reliance on lower 
layers for ‘probably good enough’ reliability, lack of security 
code and specification readiness, lack of available memory to 
store and run code, lack of any threat to be worth mitigating 
against, and security not being required to be able to 
demonstrate the protocol running in space. The complexity of 
the Bundle Protocol is one argument against placing it in low-
end embedded systems, and processing hardware for space is 
often low-end and unable to execute modern cryptographic 
algorithms rapidly. Non-essential processing is not done. 
Recent EU trials in a remote area of Sweden also did not 
implement bundle security, and so are also running without 
high-level transport reliability checks as a side-effect of not 
having security  [4]. The risks to data of doing so are well-
known, and are described in the end-to-end literature  [2]. 
The design of the Bundle Protocol is such that we suggest 
adding support for lightweight reliability checking within the 
imposed limits of the existing security framework [5]. 
Unfortunately, that workaround uses the complex security 
architecture and requires it to be implemented, so this is 
unlikely to see widespread adoption in embedded systems. 
The Bundle Protocol also expects that all communicating 
nodes have a shared understanding of UTC time and its leap 
seconds, with synchronised clocks. Bundles expire after a set 
clock time and are discarded. Bundles sent from nodes with 
misset or drifting clocks may be expired at the next node 
simply because their timestamps are in the far past or distant 
future. If you don’t know the time, you can’t ask for the time 
by using the Bundle Protocol. A bundle age extension block 
has since been proposed for when UTC time is not known, but 
setting the age still needs working, reliable, clocks. 
4. Summary of the work, potential impact and conclusion 
We have evaluated the Bundle Protocol, highlighted 
architectural problems in its design, and proposed a 
workaround to give reliability. Our work shows that the basic 
design of the Bundle Protocol neglects important architectural 
issues. We expect this to limit its adoption and deployment. 
References 
[1] W. Ivancic, W. M. Eddy, D. Stewart, L. Wood, J. Northam and 
C. Jackson, ‘Experience with delay-tolerant networking from 
orbit,’ International Journal of Satellite Communications and 
Networking, vol. 28, issues 5-6, pp. 335-351, Sep.-Dec. 2010. 
[2] J. Saltzer, D. Reed, and D. D. Clark, ‘End-to-End Arguments in 
System Design,’ ACM Transactions on Computer Systems, 
2(4), pages 277-288, 1984. 
[3] L. Wood, W. M. Eddy and P. Holliday, ‘A Bundle of Problems,’ 
IEEE Aerospace Conference, Big Sky, Montana, March 2009. 
[4] S. Farrell, ‘Security in the Wild,’ IEEE Internet Computing, vol. 
15 issue 3, pp. 86-91, May-June 2011. 
[5] W. M. Eddy, L. Wood and W. Ivancic, ‘Reliability-only 
Ciphersuites for the Bundle Protocol,’ work in progress as an 
internet draft, adopted as a workgroup draft by the IRTF Delay-
Tolerant Networking Research Group, May 2011. 
